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TRADEMARKS-LANHAM ACT-FOREIGN REGISTRANTS NEED NOT
ALLEGE USE 'IN THE UNITED STATES AND MAY WAIVE FILING REQUIREMENTS
REQUIRED FOR DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS.
On May 15, 1969, defendant foreign corporation began use of its trade-
marks, LEMON TREE, ORANGE TREE, and APPLE TREE, in Canada.' On the
same date, plaintiff domestic corporation began use of a similar product
under the name LEMON TREE in the United States. Under Canadian law,2
defendant Langis Food Ltd. could and did register its trademark in Can-
ada prior to actual use.3 Plaintiff SCM Corporation4 filed its application
with the United States Patent Office on June 18 for registration of the
LEMON TREE trademark, followed by Langis' American filing for all three
of its marks on September 19. Subsequently, on July 22, 1970, SCM Corpo-
ration filed its application for registration of its trademarks ORANGE TREE
and LIME TREE. When the United States Patent Office issued the LEMON
TREE registration to Langis in October of 1971, SCM instituted a cancella-
tion hearing regarding LEMON TREE, and opposition hearings against Lan-
gis' other two trademarks.5 On May 7, 1973, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board dismissed both attacks because it believed no requirement
of use was necessary when United States registration was predicated on a
foreign registration.' SCM then brought its action in the district court,
which decided that it would be improper to read either the federal Act7 or
the Paris Convention8 to give foreign applicants superiority over American
applicants.' Held, reversed. A foreign corporation is entitled to a valid
I The trademarks referred to dried fruit powders which, when mixed with water, produced
a soft drink beverage.
I §16(e), Trade Marks Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. T-10 (1970).
3 This registration took place on March 28, 1969.
1 SCM is the successor in interest to John LeCroy and Son, Inc., which was the actual
plaintiff in the earlier stages of the case. For the sake of clarity, SCM will refer to the present
plaintiff and all predecessors in interest.
I Cancellation of trademark registration is allowed under 15 U.S.C. §1064 (1970). Opposi-
tion to proposed trademarks is authorized under 15 U.S.C. §1063 (Supp. V 1975) (amending
15 U.S.C. §1063) (1970).
John LeCroy and Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 177 U.S.P.Q. 717 (1973).
15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1970).
Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, T.S. No. 379; revised at Lisbon Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931; revised
at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 [hereinafter cited as Paris
Convention]. The version in issue is the Lisbon revision, so any subsequent reference to the
Paris Convention will indicate the Lisbon version of the Convention.
John LeCroy and Sons, Inc. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 376 F. Supp. 962 (D.D.C. 1974). There
have been a number of articles concerning this holding in the SCM controversy, among the
best of which are: Note, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REv. 308; Note, Registration of Trade-
marks in the United States by Foreign Nationals: Is There a Use Requirement?, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 189, 200-01 (1975); Derenberg, Protection of Foreign Trademarks in the U.S.: The
Lemon Tree Case - Act 11, 5 INT'L REV. IND. PROP. & COPYRIGHT LAW (IIC) 292 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Derenberg]; 44 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 178 (1975); and Offner, Can an
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federal trademark registration based on first filing whether such filing is
in the United States or abroad, and the home filing date forms the basis
for a constructive first use date which will be superior in time to any United
States registration based solely on use. SCM Corporation v. Langis Foods,
Ltd., 539 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The substance of early United States trademark law developed from the
rules and decisions of the Patent Office, as well as from federal court
interpretation of trademark regulations.1 The important concept of trade-
mark use was based on the common law and case precedents" that re-
quired a protectable interest be shown, this protectable interest mani-
fested by showing use and public recognition of that use. 2 Further develop-
ment of the trademark law, with a corresponding shaping of the use re-
quirement, came in 1883 when the United States ratified the Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property. 3 Twenty-two years later, in
1905, the first Trademark Act was passed,' 4 requiring the applicant to
prove use in commerce in the United States. The successor to the 1905 Act
was the Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1946,' 5 which basically retained the
same requirement of use in commerce in the United States. 6 Since the
Orange Tree, a Lime Tree, and a Lemon Tree, Produce a TRT Thee?, 72 PAT. & T.M. REV.
99 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Offner].
10 Although the Patent Office was organized under constitutional authority (Article I, §8)
and immediately started developing patent law, it was not until 1876 that Congress acted to
propose a comprehensive scheme of federal trademark regulation, Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch.
274, 19 Stat. 141. This scheme, however, was struck down as unconstitutional in 1879 on the
basis that the Patent Clause of the Constitution was not intended to include in its coverage
anything other than inventions, discoveries, and writings. U.S. v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
In dicta, however, the Supreme Court indicated approval of trademark law resting on com-
mon law notions of property law and controlled by Congress through its power to control
international commerce. Id. at 92, 96-97.
" J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §16:3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
McCARTHY]. See cases cited therein.
12 Id. Of course, derivative concepts followed. The earliest user was held to gain exclusive
control of the trademark, West Distributing Co. v. Onorato, 242 F.2d 197 (C.C.P.A. 1957);
and there was a requirement of actual use of the mark, Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
240 U.S. 403, 413 (1915).
'3 Note 8 supra.
" Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
's Note 7 supra.
6 15 U.S.C. §1126 (1970). This section states in part:
b) Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty
relating to trademarks, . . . to which the United States is also a party, . . shall
be entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to
the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise
entitled by this chapter.
c) No registration of a mark in the United States by a person described in
subsection (b) of this section shall be granted until such mark has been registered
in the country of origin of the applicant, unless the applicant alleges use in com-
merce.
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1905 Act, there has been a long-running dispute over the "use in commerce
in the United States" provisions of that Act and the similar requirement
in the Lanham Act. The first major case, Rossman v. Garnier,7 decided
under the 1905 Act, stated that United States law required actual use of
the trademark, 8 but that foreign applicants need not show use within the
United States, since the court felt the clear intent of Congress was to avoid
having foreigners show use before they introduced their mark into the
United States."9 When the Lanham Act superceded the 1905 Act, one of
the first decisions on point, Ex parte British Insulated Callender's Cables
Ltd.,20 reaffirmed Rossman in large part. But the Patent Commissioner in
this decision differed in his view of the procedural aspects of registration;
there was a need under section 1(a)(3) of the Act " to show that actual use
exists somewhere by submitting "specimens or facsimiles of the mark as
actually used." 2 This requirement was held to apply to foreign as well as
domestic applicants. 23
This procedural hurdle stripped all force from the substantive law in
Rossman2 1 that actual use was not necessary for foreign applicants if they
had registered their marks in their home country registration but were not
using them.25 The critical aspect of the holding was its application of
d) An application for registration of a mark, . . . filed by a person described in
subsection (b) of this section who has previously duly filed an application for
registration of the same mark in one of the countries described in subsection (b) of
this section shall be accorded the same force and effect as would be accorded to
the same application if filed in the United States on the same date on which the
application was first filed in such foreign country: Provided, That-
(1) the application in the United States is filed within six months from
the date on which the application was first filed in the foreign country;
(2) the application conforms as nearly as practicable to the require-
ments of this chapter, but use in commerce need not be alleged;
(3) ...
(4) nothing in this subsection shall entitle the owner of a registration
granted under this section to sue for acts committed prior to the date on
which his mark was registered in this country unless the registration is
based on use in commerce.
17 211 F. 401 (8th Cir. 1914).
Id. at 405; Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §5(b), 33 Stat. 724.
" 211 F. at 408 (concurring separate opinion); Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §2, 33 Stat.
724.
83 U.S.P.Q. 319 (1949).
2 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(3) (1970).
2 83 U.S.P.Q. at 319. The applicant disputed the examiner's requirement that it show
specimens of use, an impossibility if the trademark is not yet in use.
23 Id. Foreign applicants still did not need to allege use within the United States, but they
were not relieved of the dictates of §1051(a)(3), which required evidence of actual use some-
where.
' 211 F. at 409 (concurring separate opinion).
' The same thing occurs in the United States when companies use their marks, but only
at the minimum level necessary to preserve them. Kegan, Trade-Mark "Use" - Fact or
Fiction, 55 T.M. REP. 176-77 (1965).
[Vol. 7:700
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
sections of the Act that were designed primarily for domestic applicants.
In fact, the court felt constrained by its reasoning to ignore the effect of
the Paris Convention on registration rights, 6 thus drastically narrowing
the scope of section 44 of the Lanham Act.
Rossman relied on the Paris Convention for the view, still good today,
that
if the appellee could and did obtain French trademarks, as she swears she
did in her affidavit for registration, then under Article 6 of the treaty
[Paris Convention], . . to which both France and the United States
were parties, she would be entitled to protection in this country, whether
or not we would have allowed such a mark as an original proposition under
our laws."
The Rossman/British Insulated view prevailed until 1955 when the
"Merry Cow" case- Socikt Fromageries Bell' - overruled it, holding that
the Lanham Act must be construed in a way that is consonant with the
Paris Convention. 9 The Patent Office Trial and Appeal Board first read
section 44(c) ° to mean that the applicant had to allege use in his home
country, in order to get his mark registered on the Principal Register under
section 44(e).1' However, it then used the Paris Convention as a rationale
to reverse this logic-since the applicant had met every test except use,
there was nothing wrong with granting registration. 2 Indeed, the Conven-
tion mandated this result if treaty obligations were to be complied with.3
2S 83 U.S.P.Q. at 320.
211 F. at 409 (concurring separate opinion). Under this concept, the Paris Convention
augments the Trademark Acts, not superceding either the 1905 Act or the Lanham Act, but
providing a second mode of registration available to foreign applicants. This is expressly
adopted in the Lanham Act by giving reciprocal treatment to marks registered in this coun-
try. Lanham Act §44(b), 15 U.S.C. §126(b) (1970). See Zelnick, Foreign Trademark Appli-
cants and Registrants and the Requirement of Use: The Right to Register, 52 T.M. REP. 641,
659-62 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Zelnick], for a similar hypothetical situation, showing
how this reciprocity works. See also S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The
primary reason for continuing and expanding international trademark protection was the aid
it would give United States companies operating abroad by setting a tone for fair and reasona-
ble rules regarding registration.
Since almost every country besides the United States allows registration without first using
the mark, this is a much more favorable means of gaining access to the United States market.
See Callmann, Registration and Use in Trademark Laws of Different Countries, 48 T.M. RaP.
395, 402-07 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Callmann].
2 Ex parte Soci~t6 Fromageries Bel, 105 U.S.P.Q. 392 (1955). The name "Merry Cow"
comes from the type of label the company used.
" Id. at 396. This construction goes back to the need to give reciprocity to foreign marks
so United States firms would receive the same courtesy. See Zelnick, supra note 27.
' 15 U.S.C. §1126(c) (1970). See note 16 supra.
", "A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may be regis-
tered on the principal register if eligible, .... Lanham Act §44(e), 15 U.S.C. §1126(e) (1970).
a 105 U.S.P.Q. at 398.
Id. To hold that the United States can escape the obligations of the Convention and deny
registration by the simple device of applying the use test would "make mockery of the treaty."
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With the adoption of this standard by the Soci~t: court, American law
changed. Where British Insulated had (1) required foreign applicants to
show use, there now was no necessity to make that showing; where it had
(2) required an allegation of use in the form of specimens and affidavits,
this likewise was eliminated.34
The tide was reversed in Certain Incomplete Trademarks35 less than a
decade later. The case developed from a change in Patent Office operations
which suggested that the use in commerce requirement would be further
tightened . 3 The Commissioner held that a careful reading of the Conven-
tion travaux preparatoires suggested that while the substance of national
laws was affected, procedure was not, i.e., the United States could not
require foreigners to show use in commerce, but it could require the sub-
mission of specimens of use,3 7 an impossibility if one had not yet used the
mark.3 1 The Commissioner interpreted the Paris Convention to require
Id. Cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co. Ltd., 234 F.2d 633, 643-44 (1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 871 (1956), rehearing den. 352 U.S. 913 (1956) (Lanham Act is controlling over U.S.
nationals because nothing occurring abroad is within the purview of the court). The Paris
Convention, clearly designed for the majority of nations other than the United States, does
not require any form of use and seems to apply this view to the signatories. Callmann, supra
note 27, at 295-96. See Note, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REv. 308, 316. This approach is
supported by article 2 of the Convention, which reads:
(1) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards the protection
of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages
that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals, without
prejudice to the rights specially provided by the present Convention ....
Also article 4 of the Convention states:
A.-(1) A person who has duly filed an application for a patent, .... or of a trade-
mark, . . . shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of
priority during the periods hereafter stated.
(2) Every filing that is equivalent to a regular national filing under domestic law
of any country of the Union or under bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded
between countries of the Union shall be recognized as giving rise to a right of
priority.
(3) By a regular national filing is meant any filing that is adequate to establish
the date on which the application was filed in the country concerned, whatever may
be the outcome of the application.
C.-(1) The above-mentioned periods of priority shall be twelve months for patents
and utility models, and six months for industrial designs for trademarks.
But see article 6, which reads: "(1) The conditions for the filing and registration of trademarks
shall be determined in each country of the Union by its domestic law." Paris Convention,
supra note 8 (Lisbon revision).
31 105 U.S.P.Q. at 398.
"I In re Certain Incomplete Trademark Applications, 137 U.S.P.Q. 69 (1963).
3, 37 C.F.R. §2.39 (1976).
31 137 U.S.P.Q. at 71.
Applications.would no longer have to allege use in commerce or the date of first use
pursuant to Societe, but applicants should be required to submit specimens of use anyway.
One author predicted this result even before the Incomplete Trademarks case, which was
set up in order to litigate this question. See Zelnick, supra note 27, at 641, 651.
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compliance with domestic law-here meaning section 44 of the Lanham
Act"-by foreign applicants to the greatest extent possible, and finding
insufficient compliance, he denied registration. The resulting change in
United States law seemed to imply that while use was not required in
theory (SociWt retained its force here), the Patent Office, as a practical
matter, required it. The Commissioner did not even discuss the distinction
in the Convention between use within the United States ("use in com-
merce") and use without.
The issue was next presented in the SCM (John LeCroy v. Langis Foods)
case," where the Trademark Appeal Board reached back beyond
Incomplete Trademarks (overruling it in the process) to resurrect Societk.42
The rationale here was much the same as that in Socit6; that is, reading
the Lanham Act to conflict with the Paris Convention would make little
sense, and indeed would impair the effectiveness of the Convention itself.4 3
The Board decided that section 44(d) of the Lanham Act did not require
demonstration of foreign or domestic use by foreign trademark applicants,
as long as such application was filed within six months of the home country
filing date.44 Hence, after this decision, use was not required in theory or
practice. 5
Upon review of this decision, the District Court for the District of Col-
umbia reversed," looking more to the Lanham Act than to the Paris Con-
vention.17 The court believed that the Convention did not mean to give
priority, but merely equality to foreign registrants entering the United
States market." It further interpreted the Convention to be applicable only
to procedural rights, not substantive rights." The court clearly regarded
Incomplete Trademarks to be the law as far as it concerned the rights of
parties to the Paris Convention to make their own rules and regulations,
stating that "[a]rticle 6 does not and never did control the conditions and
15 U.S.C. §1126 (1970).
137 U.S.P.Q. at 77.
177 U.S.P.Q. 717 (1973).
' Id. at 719.
3 Id.
11 Id. The opinion was not very lengthy and little of the Board's reasoning was shown other
than its disapproval of existing practice.
,1 The first reaction of the Patent Office was to give applicants provisional filing dates until
the dust settled. Unpublished memorandum of March 22, 1974, reprinted in MCCARTHY,
supra note 11, appendix VII (Dec. 1976 supp. to vol. 2) at 123.
4 John LeCroy and Son, Inc. v. Langis Food, Ltd., 376 F. Supp. 962 (1974).
Id. at 965.
' This is supported by In re Lewenbr~u Mtinchen, 175 U.S.P.Q. 178, 180-81 (1972), which
held that section 44(i) of the Lanham Act grants the same rights to United States citizens as
are given to others.
"1 376 F. Supp. at 967. The court here considered filing regulations to confer substantive
rights. The Commissioner in Incomplete Trademarks considered such regulations procedural.
The results of the decisions, however, were similar.
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formalities required by a country for obtaining a registration.."50 The next
step was to read the Lanham Act, as well as the Convention, to mean that
registration gave only procedural rights and not substantive ones, the lat-
ter arising only upon actual use.'
When SCM reached the court of appeals,52 it was the first time an appel-
late court had a chance to decide the issue of use.5 The court agreed with
the view expressed by- Socit6, and endorsed by the Trademark Appeal
Board, thereby reversing the district court. The court of appeals felt that
section 2 of the Lanham Act, dealing with standard registration, was only
a general rule, and that later sections could constrict its reach. 54 Of those
later sections, section 44(d) controls when foreign applicants seek to enter
the United States by way of the Convention. 55
The court of appeals distingbished the lower court's holding by inter-
preting section 44(d) as applying to use and not filing. The district court
had constructed the subsection to give defendant Langis a constructive
filing date in the United States based on the date of its filing abroad." The
court of appeals interpreted section 44(d) as granting "a foreign applicant
which has used the trademark in its home country after the foreign filing
but prior to the actual United States filing a constructive use date as of
the date of the foreign filing. '57
The court of appeals thought the structure of the Lanham Act was more
consistent with the view that foreign applicants, who had existing registra-
tion in some other country, did not have to conform completely to Ameri-
can procedure.58 The Paris Convention was viewed as controlling in the
Id. at 966.
' Id. at 967. In support of this proposition, the court cites Turner v. HMH, 380 F.2d 224,
228 (1967). The court also felt there was still another constraint in recognizing defendant's
Canadian registration. This obstacle was based on a line of case law holding that there was a
territorial limit on the application of the Lanham Act to the United States. 376 F. Supp. at
967. The court referred to Cooper's Inc. v. Jockey Shoe Polish, Inc., 149 U.S.P.Q. 704 (1966)
and Sterling Drug Co. v. Knoll A.-G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q. 628 (1968), both of
which denied trademark registration because use abroad could not create rights that the
territorially-limited Lanham Act could recognize, not because use abroad could not create
trademark rights at all. See also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Ltd., 234 F.2d 633
(1956). Where such a limit existed, the court perceived difficulty in allowing applicants to
utilize such advantages to the detriment of American applicants. The court therefore allowed
the opposition and cancellation of Langis' trademarks upon the showing that LeCroy was
the first domestic user. 376 F. Supp. at 967-68.
52 SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 539 F.2d 196 (1976).
' Derenberg, supra note 9, at 297.
' Section 2 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052 (1970), sets out the general guidelines for
registration; in the case at bar, section 2(d) is a logical defense since it denies registration to
marks causing confusion with previously used, unabandoned marks even if they have not yet
been registered.
. 539 F.2d at 199. See note 16 supra.
539 F.2d at 199.
5 Id.
1Id. at 199-200.
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matter because congressional intent in passing the Lanham Act was to
defer to the Convention in this area.59 Very explicitly, the court felt the
Convention's language0 provided that "intervening use during the priority
period cannot give rise to rights on the part of third parties."',
The state of the law after this appellate opinion returns SocietY's holding
to its position of prominence.62 It restates that the requirements for foreign
applicants of (1) use and (2) allegation of use in the United States were
not required by law. But while Soci&t6 used the Paris Convention as its
basis for distinguishing use in the United States, SCM relies more heavily
upon its interpretation of the Lanham Act. 3 Though the court's language
indicates that congressional intent in framing the Lanham Act was to carry
out the Paris Convention in this area of trademark law, ' the court feels
that it was possible to read the Lanham Act itself as allowing foreign
companies to register in the United States with only an allegation of for-
eign filing.6 5
Id. at 200 n.9.
" See note 33 supra.
" 539 F.2d at 201.
02 Id. at 201-02 n.12. Rather than reverse the district court on the "Merry Cow" issue, the
language in the instant case indicated that both lower level tribunals were wrong to include
it in their discussion in the first place.
11 Id. at 202. The court considered itself bound to compare §2 of the Lanham Act with §
44 and develop the best mix possible from the two sections.
64 Id. at 200 n.9.
*s In the year or so since the appellate court handed down its view in SCM and the
requirement of use, several courts have considered the same or similar issues. The reaction
has been nearly unanimous agreement, though most of the opinions were obiter dictum, since
they did not directly face this issue. See McCARTHY, supra note 11 (Dec. 1976 supp. to vol. 1)
§§ 19:23. Law review and trade articles likewise have generally favored the Court of Ap-
peals/Trademark Board position, but with less certainty. See generally note 9 supra. See also
MCCARTHY, supra note 11; Berry, Recent Developments Affecting the Protection of Conven-
tion Registration Marks in the United States, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 591 (1975); and 29th Year
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 66 T.M. REP. 337 (1976), all of which favor the Court
of Appeals view. However, it does seem clear that a three-pronged approach is still valid in
this area. See Note, 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIv. L. REv. 308. Cases can still be found to
support, at least partially, each view. At one extreme, Oland's Breweries maintained the
credence of the view favorable to domestic registrants, that is, use in foreign countries is
immaterial to the United States registration. Oland's Breweries Ltd. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
189 U.S.P.Q. 481, 483 (1975). But this is clearly the minority view. Rationales of court
decisions espousing the minority view differ, but none of them require foreign applicants to
have specimens and allegations of use when they register their trademarks in the United
States. The leading decision is undoubtedly American Petrofina, a district court decision
handed down between the district and appellate level SCM case. American Petrofina, Inc.
v. Brown, 391 F. Supp. 757 (1974). This decision rejected American use as a requirement so
long as foreign registration had occurred. The court's rationale was consistent with the re-
quirements of the Paris Convention and section 45(d) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 758. Accord,
Ariens Co. v. Kubota Ltd., 189 U.S.P.Q. 46, 48 (1975).
In another line of cases, the holding of SCM is "distinguished." For example, in the Japan
Monopoly case, the Trademark Board used section 45(e) instead of section 44(d), but reached
the same result. Consolidated Cigar Corporation v. The Japan Monopoly Corporation, 181
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It is likely that the nonuse concept will dominate judicial opinions in the
near future. As was noted, many experts in the field support the view that
the appellate court was on the right track."6 However, there is still a necess-
ity to define the problems in this area more sharply; it is otherwise too easy
for one court to distinguish, qualify, or otherwise ignore or reinterpret what
some other court has held. This area of litigation cannot be so new or novel
that no case is similar to any other.
Two recent events potentially have great impact on the concept that lack
of use is legitimate. The first occurred in 1970 when the new version of the
Paris Convention went into effect. 7 Although it is substantially the same
as the Lisbon version of 1958, the United States excepted to the first 12
articles."6 Included in these articles was the concept that trademarks
should be accepted for filing in member countries, based upon the mere
registration of the mark in the country of origin.6 It was not until 1973 that
the first 12 articles were subsequently ratified, 0 indicating United States
uncertainty about the structure of international trademark law.
The other event is the proposed Vienna Trademark Registration Treaty
(TRT) of 1973. 71 Since the United States may eventually give its approval
to TRT, the Patent Office has already proposed extensive changes in the
Lanham Act which would come into play upon ratification. 72 This Recent
Development will not attempt to analyze TRT, since that has been done
elsewhere, 73 and the treaty may not even be important without further
action soon. 7' But if TRT is ratified it would produce the same effect as
U.S.P.Q. 784 (1974). See Lanham Act §44(e), text in note 31 supra. After distinguishing SCM
on the basis of its being a subsection (d) case, the Board went on to hold that the foreign
applicant was clearly entitled to registration without the requirement of use in the United
States. 181 U.S.P.Q. at 786. The view that the Board advanced here was part of the su-
perceded Rossman case, but the language of the decision carefully indicated that it was taking
no stance on the issue of foreign use based solely on a foreign filing versus domestic use. Id.
at 785-86. In another case, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ex-
plained the district level SCM reasoning by treating the case as an unfair trade matter.
Matsushita Electric Corporation of America v. Solar Sound Systems, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64,
68 (1974).
U See, e.g., authorities cited in notes 9 and 65 supra.
,' Paris Convention, Stockholm version, supra note 8.
' Id. at 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1676 (1967).
g Id. art. 6 quinques at 1643.
'n 24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. No. 7727 (1973), entered into force Aug. 23, 1973.
Text in appendix to 63 T.M. REP. (1973) and McCARTHY, supra note 11 (app. III, Dec.
1976 supp. to vol. 2) at 125.
72 922 O.G. T.M. 1,2,3 (May 28, 1974). See also Frayne, Proposed Amendment of the
Trademark Act of 1946 to Implement TRT, 63 T.M. REP. 588, 622 (1973).
" The Trademark Reporter devoted a whole issue to the subject at 63 T.M. REP. 422 (1973).
See also THE 1972 SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of
the ABA, app. II.
1, International interest in the TRT is split. Ladas, What Does the Vienna Trademark
Registration Mean to the U.S.?, 63 T.M. REP. 551 (1973). See also Note, Trademark Registra-
tion Treaty: Clearing the Path to International Protection, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1133,
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SCM,' a possibility that would significantly strengthen the position taken
in SCM. It is also significant that nonjudicial authorities in the United
States willingly recognize that use is not required in the rest of the world'
and are ready to modify the American position. The most important ele-
ment in this regard has been the realization that while registration based
on nonuse could flood the United States with unused or purely defensive
marks,7 7 there are other means available to control these problems. Article
19 of the proposed TRT makes it clear that registration cannot be denied
merely for nonuse, but that it is legitimate to predicate cancellation of
registration on the grounds of abandonment or nonuse.
7
1
The result of this willingness to effect changes in United States trade-
mark law, whatever form it ultimately takes, will not be lost on the courts.
Because of the importance of SCM and the critical opinions generated on
both sides of the issue, it is impossible to imagine further discussions not
being cognizant of international obligations. Although there is strong opin-
ion that use should be a requirement as a general proposition," and that
the courts are misreading the Paris Convention if they think, pursuant to
the Convention, that a country cannot require use, 0 there is little doubt
that court decisions and Patent Office practice have so established this
view. If TRT passes the Senate, this view will have solid statutory ground-
ing, especially when the Lanham Act is changed to conform with it; yet if
TRT does not pass muster, it is unlikely to cause a reversal of the existing
interpretations of the Paris Convention and the Lanham Act. SCM is
important as an appellate court's acceptance of what some district courts
and patent tribunals have been recognizing all along.
To the extent that United States companies expect to be active abroad,
it is necessary to insure that the international legal system is at least
neutral, rather than antagonistic, towards them. Obviously, this does not
mean that United States registration laws must discriminate in favor of
foreign firms to achieve reciprocity, and the result in SCM does not dictate
this result. It is a desirable continuation of the experiment begun with
SocitY, one that can be terminated judicially or legislatively if unworka-
1148 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, TR71. The Note states that the TRT will not be
effective unless at least 50 countries sign it.
,5Offner, supra note 9, at 120.
, Note, TRT, supra note 74, at 1156.
7 Defensive marks are used solely to block another's ability to employ that mark, there
being no intent by the registrant to use it.
11 Note, TRT, supra note 74, at 1155. See Vienna Trademark Registration Treaty, supra
note 71.
" Compare March, Intention to Use - 1938 to 1963, 53 T.M. REP. 984 (1963) with Dalsi-
mer, Intention to Use - A Proposal, 53 T.M. REP. 975 (1963).
11 Offner, supra note 9, at 112-17. The author cites Siscoe Vermiculite Mines and other
foreign cases to establish the view held abroad that each nation is allowed to set its own filing
requirement. Siscoe Vermiculite Mines v. Munn and Steel, Inc., 31 C.P.R. 6 (1959).
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ble; that is, if domestic corporations are put at a disadvantage on their
home soil. To date, the evidence does not show any such result.
John A. Cutler
